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 Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data
 ROBERT S. ERIKSON Columbia University
 THOMAS R. PALFREY California Institute of Technology
 W T He present a formal game-theoretic model to explain the simultaneity problem that makes it difficult
 to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of both incumbent and challenger spending in U.S.
 House elections. The model predicts a particular form of correlation between the expected
 closeness of the race and the level of spending by both candidates, which implies that the simultaneity
 problem should not be present in close races and should be progressively more severe in the range of safe
 races that are empirically observed. This is confirmed by comparing simple OLS regression of races that are
 expected to be close with races that are not, using House incumbent races spanning two decades.
 T his article presents new estimates of the effects
 on the vote of spending by incumbents and
 challengers in U.S. House elections. As first
 pointed out by Jacobson (1978), estimation by ordinary
 least squares regression produces strong coefficients
 for challenger spending but virtually no effect for
 incumbent spending. Few would argue, however, that
 the latter does not matter. The obvious reason for the
 near-zero coefficients for incumbent spending using
 OLS is a simultaneity bias, because incumbents spend
 more when they are in electoral trouble. Somewhat less
 obvious, and less commonly acknowledged, is that the
 opposite bias can be present for challengers, who spend
 more when their prospects are good. In short, the OLS
 estimates are biased because one is not controlling for
 candidate expectations of the vote, and these expecta-
 tions drive spending decisions. We address this prob-
 lem directly by formulating and solving a game-theo-
 retic model of campaign spending and identifying
 precisely the finer structure of these simultaneity prob-
 lems. This characterization of the equilibrium of the
 spending game has direct implications for obtaining
 unbiased estimates of incumbent and challenger spend-
 ing effects, without resorting to multiequation systems.
 Several statistical solutions have been proposed to
 estimate the effects of incumbent spending by over-
 coming the simultaneity bias. The most common solu-
 tion is two-stage least squares, whereby instrumental
 variables are used as proxies for observed incumbent
 spending. Green and Krasno (1988) used lagged in-
 cumbent spending as an instrument, whereas Gerber
 (1998) used such instruments as challenger wealth and
 state population in an analysis of Senate elections.
 Both found significant effects for incumbent spending.
 In an alternative approach, Erikson and Palfrey (1993,
 1998) achieved statistical identification by means of
 restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix. By as-
 suming that the covariances between each spending
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 variable and the vote were caused by only vote-on-
 spending and spending-on-vote effects, they also found
 significant effects for incumbent spending, somewhat
 larger in magnitude than those of Green and Krasno
 (1988) but still significantly smaller than challenger
 spending effects. In a third approach, Abramowitz
 (1991) used OLS but attempted to neutralize the
 simultaneity bias by using Congressional Quarterly fore-
 casts of election outcomes as a control for expectations.
 Even with this control, negligible coefficients for in-
 cumbent spending were found, and Abramowitz con-
 cluded that incumbent spending has little effect on the
 vote. In sum, due to seemingly unavoidable method-
 ological difficulties, a consensus has not yet emerged
 regarding both the relative and absolute magnitudes of
 incumbent and challenger spending effects on congres-
 sional election outcomes.
 Our new approach to estimating spending effects
 uses insights from game theory. We apply OLS to a
 subset of congressional districts for which a game-
 theoretic model predicts that the simultaneity bias
 should be minimal or nonexistent. In these districts,
 new sources of challenger vote support do not neces-
 sarily drive up challenger and incumbent spending.
 Which districts are they? They are districts in which,
 before taking spending into account, the vote is ex-
 pected to be close or even slightly in favor of the
 challenger. When a close race is expected, both spend-
 ing effects can be reliably estimated by simple OLS.
 We proceed as follows. First, we present the theo-
 retical argument for a near-zero simultaneity bias in
 districts in which the vote is expected to be close.
 Second, we translate this theoretical argument into a
 set of statistical hypotheses and derive closed-form
 expressions for the asymptotic bias of OLS estimates of
 spending effects. Third, we provide evidence in support
 of the predicted curvilinear effects of the expected vote
 on spending. When the expected vote approximates a
 50-50 split, the slopes for spending on (expected) vote
 are near zero, so that the simultaneity bias should be
 near zero. Fourth, we present the key empirical result.
 When the vote is expected to be close (and, thus, the
 simultaneity bias is minimal), the OLS estimates of
 spending effects are of roughly equal magnitude for
 incumbents and challengers. We conclude with a dis-
 cussion of our findings.
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 THEORY: THE SPENDING GAME
 Our empirical results can be understood in the context
 of an extended version of the simple spending game
 framework of Erikson and Palfrey (1993). The model is
 meant to capture the strategic aspect of spending by
 two competing candidates, I (the incumbent) and C
 (the challenger).1 The spending decisions of the two
 candidates are intertwined because these decisions
 jointly affect the probability the incumbent will win.
 Thus, the amount one candidate chooses to spend will
 depend both on the amount the other candidate is
 spending and on the expected closeness of the race.
 This is the spending game.2 An equilibrium of the game
 consists of a spending decision for each candidate with
 the property that neither candidate can do better by
 spending more or less than this amount, given the
 opponent's spending decision and the current electoral
 conditions. What we show below is the intuitive idea
 that the equilibrium spending levels of both candidates
 will increase monotonically with the expected closeness
 of the race.
 The importance of our theoretical analysis is as
 follows. The formal model implies, among other things,
 that candidates will indeed maximize their spending
 when the expected vote is in the neighborhood of
 50-50. As a result, for "toss-up" races, the vote-on-
 spending effects will be approximately zero. For com-
 petitive races in the range of a close expected vote but
 in which incumbents are slightly favored, the vote-on-
 spending slopes should be negative but small in mag-
 nitude. For races expected to be lopsided in favor of
 the incumbent, the slopes will be negative and large in
 magnitude, which can create possibly severe simulta-
 neity problems. Because most races fall in the latter
 category, regressions that pool all races are fundamen-
 tally flawed, even if instrumental variables are used,
 since that method does not adjust for the fact that the
 simultaneity problem varies with expected closeness in
 a predictable and nonlinear way.
 The formal structure of the game has the following
 basic features. Each candidate cares about the proba-
 bility of winning more than 50% of the vote in the
 election. The probability I wins is determined by
 district characteristics, short-term forces, candidate
 characteristics, campaign spending, and chance. For
 the moment, treat the first three categories of variables
 as exogenously fixed. We then can summarize the
 effects of campaign spending and chance by a simple
 twice continuously differentiable function, P, which
 denotes the incumbent's probability of winning as a
 function of spending by each of the candidates. The
 probability the incumbent wins also depends on what
 we call the (prespending) anticipated margin of victory
 of the incumbent, denoted m. All else equal, the higher
 is m, the higher is P. The anticipated victory margin
 incorporates factors that the candidates both treat as
 exogenous, including national short-term forces and
 1 The theoretical analysis also can be applied to open seat races.
 2 Related theoretical work on tournaments as incentive devices and
 on the effect of commitment on behavior in contests can be found in
 Dixit 1987, Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983, Rosen 1986.
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 such district characteristics as partisanship, as well as
 other factors, such as candidates' health, a recent
 scandal, and so forth. Each candidate can raise and
 spend money in the campaign, and the outcome of the
 election is a function of how much each spends, the
 prespending anticipated margin of victory of the in-
 cumbent, and some random noise.
 Raising campaign resources is a costly activity.
 Promises must be made (Baron 1989a, 1989b), issue
 positions compromised, fundraisers attended, and so
 forth. This is formally represented by two twice contin-
 uously differentiable, increasing, convex fundraising
 cost functions, one for each candidate, denoted K,(I)
 and KC(C). The final piece of the equation is the value
 of winning. We normalize this value at 1 for both the
 incumbent and the challenger.3 Hence, the payoff
 functions to the two candidates are given by:
 U1(I, C; m) = P(I, C, m) -K(I);
 Uc(I, C; m) = 1 - P(I, C, m) - Kc(C).
 We proceed by studying the properties of the Nash
 equilibria of this game. A Nash equilibrium is defined
 as a pair of spending levels for each candidate, I* and
 C*, such that each maximizes her payoff (probability of
 winning minus fundraising costs), given the spending
 level of the opponent. In particular, we wish to estab-
 lish existence of a Nash equilibrium of the spending
 game and then prove that equilibrium spending levels
 will be higher in closer races.
 To guarantee existence of a Nash equilibrium that is
 fully characterized by the first-order conditions, we
 assume that each payoff function is strictly concave in
 the candidate's own spending level.4 This assumption
 implies properties of both P and K. Roughly speaking,
 it says that in addition to K being convex, P cannot be
 too deterministic. The concavity assumption is:
 82p
 ai2 (I, C, m) - K',(I) < 0;
 82p
 -c2 (I, C, m) - K'"(C) < 0.
 To rule out uninteresting boundary solutions, we also
 assume K'(0) = Kc(0) = 0. Thus, the optimal level of
 spending for the incumbent, I*, given some level of
 spending by C, is always unique, is always strictly
 positive, and is characterized by the solution to:
 3P
 aI (I*, C, m) - K,(I*) = O.
 Similarly, for the challenger, we have:
 3This normalization is without loss of generality, since we allow the
 incumbent and challenger to have different cost functions. It is also
 possible to generalize the cost functions. For example, the campaign
 fundraising cost function could be allowed to depend on m in an
 additively separable way.
 4 If the game were not concave, we would have to resort to mixed
 equilibria.
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 - (I, C*, m) - KC(C*) = 0.
 ac3C
 Because the game is concave and reaction functions
 are strictly positive, there exists an equilibrium with
 strictly positive levels of spending by both candidates.
 In equilibrium, these conditions are simultaneously
 satisfied for both, so equilibrium pairs (I*, C*) are
 characterized by the following equations:5
 3P
 aI (I*, C*, m) - K,(I*) = 0; (1
 U3P
 - (I*, C*, m) - K(C*) = 0. (2)
 ac3C
 For the empirical section, we are interested in
 identifying how J* and C * change with m and how they
 both ovary with P. We next identify intuitive assump-
 tions on the cross-partial derivatives of P, which imply
 that J* and C* are decreasing in m in elections that
 favor the incumbent, increasing in m for elections that
 favor the challenger, and are independent of m for
 toss-ups. This also implies that spending covaries with
 P in a similar direction. Moreover, we provide a
 particular specification of P() that satisfies these as-
 sumptions and is consistent with the standard linear
 regression models used in empirical studies.6
 Since the first-order conditions must hold for every
 value of m, we can take the total derivative of the
 left-hand side of equations 1 and 2 with respect to m;
 set it equal to zero; and use this to identify conditions
 dI*1dm < 0. As we pointed out earlier, and show
 formally in Appendix A, this will imply that OLS
 estimates of the J* coefficient are biased downward in
 elections the incumbent is expected to win. This pro-
 cedure also allows us to obtain sufficient conditions for
 dC*/dm < 0, which are slightly different owing to the
 fact that challengers who expect incumbents to spend
 less will respond by spending more. Taking these total
 derivatives produces the following two equations:
 a2p dC* a2p
 dI* aIaC dm aIam
 dm a2p
 KI- ai2
 a2p dI* a2p
 +
 dC* aIaC dm aCam
 dm a2p
 K'c + ac2
 These are linear in the two unknowns, dC*/dm and
 dI*1dm, and can be solved easily. The solutions are:
 5There may be multiple components of the equilibrium correspon-
 dence, but the comparative static properties we derive below are
 satisfied locally with respect to each equilibrium.
 6 Moreover, equilibrium is unique for this specification, which guar-
 antees unambiguous comparative statics.
 a2p F a2p- a2p a2p
 dI* aMMm K[ c+ ac2J aCam aiMC
 dm A
 a2p [ 82p- a2p a2p
 ai
 dC* aCam L J alam MI3C
 dm A
 where
 - 2p- - 2p- - 82p -2
 A =K'+ C2 K'I - -6 + AIC > 0
 by the second-order conditions. Therefore, dI*/dm <
 0 if and only if
 a2p F 82p- a2p a2p
 alam [KG + a c2- aCm alac K0, (3)
 and dC*/dm < 0 if and only if
 a2p [ a2p- a2p a2p
 aCam K'I - 2J alam aiac < 0. (4)
 We assume that inequalities 3 and 4 hold. We next
 show that these conditions for dI*/dm < 0 and
 dC*/dm < 0 are satisfied in a wide class of models of
 P that are commonly used in empirical work.
 First, let the index of incumbent vote margin, m, be
 simply the baseline (prespending) expected incumbent
 share of the vote minus .5, normalized at candidate
 spending levels of I = C = 0. Let the incumbent's
 actual margin of victory, M (which can be negative),
 equal m, plus a function (not necessarily linear) of
 incumbent spending, g,(I), plus some function of chal-
 lenger spending, gc(C), plus a random term, ?, with
 cumulative distribution function F(s). Assume g~(I) >
 0, gc(C) < 0; F is twice differentiable; and its density
 function, f = F', is symmetric and single peaked
 around 0.7 This impfiesf' (?) > 0 for ? K 0, andf' (?) K
 O for ? > 0. Thus, we can write
 M = m + g(I) + gc(C) + E.
 The incumbent wins if and only if M > 0 or if and only
 if ? > -m - g1(I) - gc(C), so
 P(I, C, m) = 1 - F[-m - g,(I) - gc(C)]
 = F~rn + g1(I) + gc(C)]. (5)
 It is easy to verify that inequalities 3 and 4 for
 dI*/dm < 0 and for dC*/dm < 0 are satisfied when'
 K 0 for many P functions. As an illustration, suppose
 that F is normally distributed with variance u2 and that
 g, and gc are linear.8 Thus, equation 5 reduces to:
 P(I, C, m) =b[ + ~VI + 1VC1j
 7 The symmetry assumption can be dropped without loss of gener-
 ality.
 8 This corresponds to most empirical works on the subject, which
 employ regression models with linear spending effects.
 - ~~~~~~597
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 where (F is the unit normal cumulative distribution
 function. Substitution into equilibrium conditions 1
 and 2 yields the following two equations as the first-
 order conditions:
 P VII m)-K(I (6)
 - eVC p(ll *) = KC(C (7)
 where p(l1) is the unit normal density function
 evaluated at the expected win margin, adjusted for
 equilibrium spending effects and incumbent vulnerabil-
 ity, H* =(m + 13P71* + Pvcc*)/U.9 The expression
 I *is the "postspending" expected vote margin for the
 incumbent, in contrast to m, which is the prespending
 expected vote margin for the incumbent. Thus, it is
 important to keep in mind that I * is endogenous,
 whereas m is exogenous.
 It follows immediately from equations 6 and 7 that
 elections expected to be close (measured by II* ) will
 involve higher spending levels by both candidates. This
 is true because yp is maximized at I * = 0, and
 fundraising costs increase with spending.
 We also wish to show that spending is higher in
 closer elections, measured by m. Because m indexes
 incumbent vote margin rather than expected close-
 ness,10 the comparative statics with respect to m will
 necessarily depend on whether we are at an equilib-
 rium with ll* > 0 or l1* < 0. Suppose that l1* > 0.
 Because spending effects enter linearly and the normal
 density function, 'p, is monotonically decreasing in the
 absolute value of its argument, inequalities 3 and 4
 derived above are both satisfied. Formally:
 a2p 2VI
 dC2 a2>p'(Ill)<O;
 =d - 2 Nt21r TP (PI J m) < O;
 alam - 2 7
 a2p 1VC I
 ac2 -T o2 ~2ii7 cp(ll <0
 a2p 18vc
 -P I~ K', *M >
 aCam - o2 ~21,T ~ )>0
 a2pP 1VIP vc
 aiac = o-2 2i T'M11 ) > 0; and
 c32P P
 VI o- 1 (rn) <0.
 a2p
 a~am
 9 Keep in mind that the equilibrium spending effects themselves are
 a function of m.
 10 That is, expected closeness decreases in the absolute value of m.
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 and
 c32P c32P c32P d2P _ vcf3 ,n*
 aCam ai2 - alam caIcaC = 4 2'r m
 _ VI~v~c)p'(ll*) = 0;
 acam-6-T V2
 c32P d2P c32P V 2P C) viIc
 alam aC2 - aCam aiaC 4 &' 2 (
 P VC(2VIC) M'( ) = 0,
 which, from inequalities 3 and 4, implies that both
 parties spend more in elections that are expected to be
 close. That is, dI*1dm < 0 and dC*/dm < 0. Also
 notice that this specification of P has the nice property
 that if spending effects and marginal fundraising costs
 are symmetric for incumbents and challengers, then
 II * is exactly equal to m. Even if these effects are not
 exactly symmetric for the two candidates, continuity
 implies that II* will closely track m, so the prespend-
 ing index of incumbent strength, m, is also an equilib-
 rium postspending index of incumbent expected vote
 margin. In the closest possible race, in which Hl* = 0,
 'p attains its maximum, so equilibrium spending is
 maximized for both candidates. For incumbents less
 vulnerable than this (nearly all cases in practice),
 equilibrium spending by each candidate is decreasing
 in the (normalized) equilibrium expected incumbent
 share, l M.
 Before proceeding, it is useful to point out that signs
 on the three cross-partial derivatives-a2P/aCam > 0,
 a2P/alam < 0, and a2P/aIaC > 0-have a natural
 interpretation. Consider the first two of these. Because
 the density function is single peaked at 0, the effect of
 spending on the probability of winning is higher the
 closer the election is expected to be. That is, it is
 highest at II * = 0. Then, for values of m such that the
 equilibrium probability the incumbent wins is exactly
 .5, the sign of both cross-partials is 0, since (p'(O) = 0.
 (In this case, equilibrium spending levels are locally
 constant in m.) For values of m higher than this, the
 equilibrium probability the incumbent wins is greater
 than .5; therefore, as m increases, all else held con-
 stant, the election will be less close, so the marginal
 effect of spending (proportional to p(ll*,)) is lower,
 which is precisely what is meant by a2P/aCam > 0 and
 a2P/alam < 0. The third cross-partial derivative has a
 similar interpretation. When ll* > 0, greater spend-
 ing by the challenger leads to a closer election, which
 makes the marginal effect of incumbent spending
 higher, hence a2P/aIaC > 0.11
 A mirror image of this effect arises if IIn < 0. For
 this rare category of races, in which incumbents are
 11 For values of m such that the equilibrium probability the incum-
 bent wins is less than .5, the signs of these cross-partials are all
 reversed. In that case, data would exhibit the opposite feature, in
 which equilibrium incumbent and challenger spending would be
 positively correlated with the vote.
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 more likely to lose than to win, equilibrium spending by
 each candidate actually increases in the normalized
 equilibrium expected incumbent margin of victory,
 l* . Finally, if cost and spending effects are roughly
 the same for the incumbent and the challenger, then
 1M O0if and only if m 0.
 To consider specific candidate cost functions, sup-
 pose K is quadratic, so K,(I) = (1/2a1)12 and
 KC(C) = (1/2ac)C2, where ct and oc can be inter-
 preted as fundraising efficiency parameters for the
 incumbent and challenger, respectively. Substituting
 this into the equilibrium equations above yields
 I0VI (11 *) = I (8)
 -tCpvc (-*M) = C. (9)
 o- 21;T
 This implies that equilibrium candidate spending
 should be proportional to the normal density of the
 expected incumbent margin of victory. It is also inter-
 esting to note another property of the equilibrium. Our
 assumptions guarantee that C* and I* are both strictly
 positive, so we can divide equation 8 by equation 9 to
 obtain
 I* (m) aA13vI
 C*(m) atclvc'
 which illustrates explicitly why there is a positive cor-
 relation between I* and C* in the normal-quadratic
 model that is so widely used for estimation.
 The key is that, for districts in the range of a 50-50
 expected vote, the vote-on-spending slopes are near
 zero; cases with mildly negative slopes balance a similar
 number of mildly positive slopes. Therefore, by limiting
 our sample to races expected to be close, there should
 be little concern about a simultaneity bias to distort the
 estimation of spending effects in the OLS estimation of
 the vote equation.
 METHODOLOGY: SIMULTANEITY BIAS AND
 VARYING PARAMETERS
 The following three-equation system is used to explain
 the methodological implications of our theoretical
 model. The first equation has incumbent share of the
 two-party vote as a dependent variable, and the other
 two have challenger and incumbent spending, respec-
 tively, as the dependent variable. This system was
 studied extensively in Erikson and Palfrey (1998), and
 the reader is referred there for more details.
 V= vCC + PI + yZ + Ev; (10)
 C = rCVPC + FC = ICVV + WC; (11)
 I = PIVi + FI = KIEV + WI; (12)
 where
 V = incumbent percentage of the (two-party)
 vote;
 C = the log of challenger spending (in 1978 dol-
 lars) plus 5,000;
 I = the log of incumbent spending (in 1978 dol-
 lars) plus 5,000;
 Z = a set of instruments to predict the incumbent
 vote without directly affecting spending;
 Vc, VIm= the challenger and incumbent expectations of
 the incumbent vote margin;
 Vc = V + uc and VI = V + u, (candidates observe
 an imperfect signal of V); and
 WC = P3cvuc + ?-c and wi = MjvuJ + .I.
 We assume wc and w, are uncorrelated with ?v, but
 we allow that wc and w, may be correlated with each
 other.
 Two interesting methodological problems occur in
 the estimation of this three-equation system. The first
 and most commonly noted is simultaneity. In a nut-
 shell, both candidates spend more when races are
 close. The second involves "varying parameters." That
 is, the coefficients on the independent variables in the
 two spending equations (11 and 12) vary across the
 sample in a systematic way. Specifically, our theoretical
 model establishes that the equilibrium values of Acv
 and Rev covary with expected vote.
 We next derive the asymptotic bias of the coefficients
 in the vote equation and prove that this bias vanishes in
 close races. Before presenting the formal argument, we
 explain the intuition behind this. The results from the
 theory section established that both Acv and Rev are
 approximately zero when V is in the neighborhood of
 50%. This is very important, because it means that
 incumbent and challenger spending on "close" races in
 this range can be treated simply as exogenous, and
 unbiased estimation of the vote equation can be done
 by OLS, which we prove formally below. Intuitively, it
 means that the parameters of equations 11 and 12
 vanish. In contrast, for the large majority of districts
 used in past cross-sectional studies, V is significantly
 greater than 50, and icv and Rev are negative in this
 region, with their magnitude varying with V in a
 nonlinear way. This implies a negative bias in the OLS
 estimates of Acv and Rev, so OLS will inflate chal-
 lenger spending effects and deflate incumbent spending
 effects.
 To derive formally the asymptotic bias of the spend-
 ing-on-vote coefficients, we fix Z at some level, so that
 Siv and Acv can be treated as approximately constant.
 To simplify the exposition, suppose that, conditional on
 Z, I and C are uncorrelated.12 Standard analysis then
 yields (see Appendix A for derivation):
 pJ(2
 plim 13LJS = ITVI + (1 - ,- cvIvc)u 1V
 (13)
 unless LIv = 0, and
 = VC PC+ 2 0 3V
 plim vc Ivc +(1 - j /vi - I3CVIVC)UC
 (14)
 12 The general case is treated in Appendix A.
 599
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 unless Icv = 0. The second terms in equations 13 and
 14 represent the asymptotic bias of the OLS estimate of
 the spending-on-vote coefficients, and u2 denotes vari-
 ance.
 It follows immediately that if ftv = ICV = 0, then
 the asymptotic bias disappears for both challenger and
 incumbent spending effects, and OLS estimates of PIv
 and IPvc are consistent. This is indeed our main
 theoretical point, since the spending game model im-
 plies that SHv = ICV = 0 when the expected vote is
 50_50.13 Therefore, LVI and vc can be estimated
 without simultaneity bias by using close races. Further-
 more, as we show in Appendix A, this is true even if I
 and C are highly correlated.
 Even when races are not expected to be close, it is
 not difficult to sign the bias terms. It is easy to show
 that (1 - IvpvI - PIcpvc) > 0, so the sign of the
 two bias terms in equations 13 and 14 are given by the
 signs of REv and Ace respectively. If the incumbent is
 expected to have a safe margin of victory, then the vote
 effects on spending (DID and Icv) are negative (safer
 incumbents induce less spending), so the estimates of
 both spending effects on the vote are biased in the
 negative direction. Hence, the bias deflates the positive
 effect of incumbent spending on the incumbent vote
 and inflates the negative effect of challenger spending
 on the incumbent vote.14
 Interestingly, the two biases are not exactly symmet-
 rical, even if the vote-on-spending effects are equal for
 incumbents and challengers. The reason is that, empir-
 ically, challenger spending has more variance than
 incumbent spending (U2 < UC), so the negative simul-
 taneity bias deflates the incumbent spending effect to a
 greater extent than it inflates the challenger spending
 effect. One final point remains. The parameters REV
 and Acv are only approximately constant because, for
 instance, REv will locally vary as V responds as a
 function of both wv and cI, even with Z held fixed. But
 if the variability in REV and fcv is symmetrical in the
 neighborhood of 50% (so that the effect of 50 + c
 percent of the vote equals the effect of 50 - c percent),
 then nothing of consequence changes. Should this
 symmetry not hold, the point at which the asymptotic
 bias is exactly equal to 0 could be slightly greater than
 or slightly less than 50-50.
 THE DATA
 The units of our analysis are 1,792 contested House
 races, 1974-80 and 1984-90, involving a veteran (i.e.,
 nonfreshman) incumbent who won a contested race
 from the same district in the previous election.15 We
 generated a reduced-form equation whereby we pre-
 dict the expected prespending incumbent vote (Z)
 13 By continuity, the asymptotic bias is approximately 0 for close
 races in the neighborhood of 50-50.
 14 Note that if the expected incumbent vote were less than 50%, then
 the direction of the bias would reverse, and spending effects would be
 inflated.
 15 The 1982 races were excluded because we use lagged incumbent
 vote to construct Z, and the 1980 incumbent vote does not match the
 1982 incumbent vote due to redistricting.
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 from a collection of exogenous variables: lagged in-
 cumbent vote; district presidential vote for the incum-
 bent's party (1976 in the 1970s, 1988 in the 1980s); and
 effects for year, incumbent party, a dummy for south-
 ern states, and the relevant interaction terms.16 Be-
 cause this reduced-form equation is lengthy and tan-
 gential to our central point, the details of its
 construction are presented in Appendix B. It accounts
 for 58% of the variance in the incumbent vote. We
 exploit this equation to obtain an expected incumbent
 vote, which is not identical to the expected vote that
 candidates themselves observe, but we consider it a
 good measure of the candidates' expected vote that is
 uncontaminated by spending effects.
 This measure of the expected vote (Z) serves as an
 instrumental variable for a two-stage least-squares
 analysis of the effects of the (expected) vote on the two
 spending variables. If the vote-on-spending effects were
 linear, then we would simply regress spending on the
 predicted vote. Here, our prediction is decidedly non-
 linear, following our theoretical argument. Accord-
 ingly, our task is to estimate the nonlinear slope
 contingent on the value of the expected vote.
 The Effect of the Vote on Spending
 Do we obtain our prediction of a curvilinear effect of
 the vote on spending, that is, zero when the vote is
 50-50? Figure 1 is a scatter plot of the logarithm of
 real challenger spending in all veteran-contested
 House elections between 1972 and 1990 against incum-
 bent share of the vote.
 The fit with the simple normal-quadratic model
 proposed above is surprisingly good. To illustrate, we
 have superimposed a fitted nonlinear regression line,17
 using locally weighted least squares, or LOWESS
 (Cleveland 1979). This has a shape that resembles the
 bell curve signature of a normal distribution, with a
 maximum near to 50% of the incumbent vote, as
 predicted. A similar graph in Figure 2 for incumbent
 spending as a function of vote shows a similar fit.
 As clear as the patterns of figures 1 and 2 appear to
 be, technically they are not quite right. Just as we
 should not estimate the effects of spending on the vote
 without considering the simultaneity bias from the
 influence of anticipated vote on spending, we should
 not depict the (anticipated) vote-on-spending effect
 without considering the reverse effects of spending on
 the vote. Accordingly, we turn to the two-stage least-
 squares approach to estimate the nonlinear slopes of
 spending predicted from the proxy for the vote, that is,
 our prediction of the vote in the reduced-form equa-
 tion (Z). We simply show the nonlinear lopes of
 spending contingent on the expected vote rather than
 the actual vote. This task approximates the presenta-
 tion of figures 1 and 2; by using the instrumental
 16 Year, incumbent party, and region (South/non-South) were com-
 bined in all possible interactions, in effect generating separate
 intercepts for 8 x 2 x 2 = 32 groups, such as "nonsouthern 1974
 Republicans."
 17 The fit is done using a bandwidth of .20.
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 variable of the expected vote, we avoid any distortion
 due to causal feedback.
 Figure 3 displays the estimated vote-on-spending
 effects, using Z as our proxy for the actual vote. The
 slopes shown are LOWESS estimates-nonlinear
 curves built from locally linear approximations over
 different bands of the expected vote. Figure 3 replicates
 the patterns shown in figures 1 and 2. We observe the
 nonlinearity in the slopes, corresponding to the kind of
 nonlinearity predicted by the theoretical model pre-
 sented previously. For lopsided races in the 55-75%
 range, the spending-on-vote slopes are steeply nega-
 tive. As the expected incumbent vote approaches 50%,
 the spending-on-vote slopes flatten considerably. We
 also see evidence of the predicted sign reversal when
 the incumbent's expected vote drops below 50%, a fate
 that befell 17 incumbents.
 By overlaying the spending functions for incumbents
 and challengers in the same graph, Figure 3 highlights
 asymmetries between their spending equations. The
 slope is steeper for challengers than for incumbents.
 The largest spending gaps are in safe districts, which is
 consistent with the theoretical argument that in safer
 seats there is more incentive for contributors to invest
 in incumbents rather than challengers (Baron 1989a,
 1989b; Snyder 1990). Note that in very competitive
 districts the gap between incumbent and challenger
 spending virtually disappears. Incumbents evidently
 are usually better able to raise money than are chal-
 lengers but not due only to their incumbency. Rather,
 an incumbent's advantage over a challenger in raising
 cash appears to increase with his likelihood of winning.
 To the extent that the expectation of victory induces
 lower costs of fundraising, the effect of spending on the
 vote becomes all the more crucial. A spending advan-
 tage induced by an anticipated victory further increases
 the advantage of likely winners if indeed candidate
 spending appreciably affects the vote.
 For the purpose of estimating spending effects, it is
 less important to account for the exact spending func-
 tions than to note that the functions shown in figures 1
 and 2 are maximized when the vote is 50-50. We now
 see that our game-theoretic model of optimal spending
 decisions by candidates is not merely an exercise in
 formal theory; it matches up with the data surprisingly
 well. Thus, it provides a rigorous and empirically sound
 theoretical foundation for what common sense has
 long suggested should be a basic law of campaign
 spending: All else equal, both candidates will spend
 more when the election is expected to be close.
 These results clearly indicate the nature of the
 measurement problem in estimating the effects of
 challenger and incumbent spending on the vote. Since
 the (expected) incumbent vote in contested House
 elections is almost always in the range of 55-75%,
 simultaneity should bias OLS estimates of incumbent
 spending effects downward and estimates of challenger
 spending effects upward (more negative for the incum-
 bent vote).18 Any simple one-equation model will
 18 Approximately 80% of the cases (1,491 of 1,792) have an expected
 vote in the 55-75% range.
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 FIGURE 2. Incumbent Vote by Incumbent Spending: Smoothed Regression (LOWESS)
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 generally overestimate the negative effect of challenger
 spending and underestimate the positive effect of in-
 cumbent spending on the incumbent share of the vote.
 We are now in a position to correct this situation. By
 isolating districts where the vote is expected to be
 close, we select districts where the additional shocks to
 the expected vote should have little effect on spending.
 For these districts, incumbent spending and challenger
 spending can be considered exogenous, which we can
 estimate via OLS.
 The Effects of Spending on the Vote
 Table 1 presents OLS equations that predict the in-
 cumbent vote from the two logged spending variables
 and the expected vote, with cases grouped according to
 expected vote. In column 1 is the equation for the 40
 very close races with an expected incumbent vote below
 52%. For these contests, the means for both the actual
 and predicted incumbent vote are virtually 50%. In
 theory, if the effects of incumbent and challenger
 spending are identical, we should find virtually identi-
 cal coefficients for the two spending variables, except
 for their sign. This is what column 1 shows.19 More-
 19 Using conventional significance levels, one cannot reject the null
 hypothesis that these coefficients are the same.
 602
 over, even with only 40 cases, both spending coeffi-
 cients are statistically significant.20
 Column 2 expands the analysis to the 77 cases in
 which the expected incumbent vote was 52-55%. As
 illustrated in Figure 3, this is the beginning of the range
 of the expected vote at which the slopes for its effect on
 spending are negative. Here, the statistical bias should
 create only a mild diminution of the incumbent spend-
 ing coefficient. Column 2 shows another statistically
 significant coefficient for incumbent spending, but less
 than that for challenger spending, as predicted.21
 When the incumbent is expected to win by about
 55% or more, the vote-on-spending slopes are steeply
 negative, so the bias is quite severe. As column 3 of
 Table 1 reveals, for districts in which the incumbent is
 expected to receive 55-58% of the vote, the OLS
 estimate of incumbent spending is negligible and de-
 cidedly nonsignificant. This pattern is repeated in
 further categories of three-point increments of the
 expected incumbent vote. Overall, when that vote
 exceeds 58%, the simultaneity problem is so severe that
 20 These results hold when candidate quality is controlled by means
 of a dummy variable, challenger prior office, added to the right-hand
 side; they also hold (with an increased standard error, as expected),
 when Z is replaced by its many component variables. See Appendix
 B for details.
 21 The difference is significant at the p = .11 level.
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 the coefficient on incumbent spending actually reverses
 sign. The estimates are presented in column 4. The
 pooled results for all cases are given in column 5, which
 produces the well-known implausible result that chal-
 lenger spending matters, but incumbent spending does
 not.
 Our OLS estimates convincingly demonstrate that
 incumbent spending matters in close races. It may be
 tempting also to accept the OLS estimates for less
 competitive races, which would suggest that, unlike
 vulnerable incumbents, safe incumbents cannot spend
 effectively. It would be a mistake, however, to treat the
 coefficients in Table 1, columns 4 and 5, as anything
 short of seriously biased, given the formal results
 discussed earlier. Of course, there is no plausible
 reason why marginal incumbents (often marginal be-
 cause of their own ineptitude) would spend effectively,
 whereas safe incumbents (coded safe in part due to
 their track record) would spend ineffectively.
 As we move from competitive to safe seats, the OLS
 coefficients for incumbent spending decline so far as to
 be virtually zero. Meanwhile, the OLS coefficients for
 challenger spending show no corresponding increase.
 If simultaneity bias for noncompetitive races accounts
 for the deflated estimates for incumbent spending, why
 do we not see an inflation in coefficients for challenger
 spending? There are at least three contributing factors
 that can be identified.
 First, for challengers and perhaps for incumbents as
 well, it is plausible that spending effects (votes gained
 per logged dollar) decline when the seat is perceived as
 safe. When the outcome appears foregone, voters may
 pay less attention, and candidates may spend a smaller
 portion of their budget on actual vote-winning activi-
 ties. Furthermore, the generally inexperienced chal-
 lengers for safe seats may spend inefficiently. All this
 suggests offsetting processes that affect OLS estimates
 of challenger spending effects as one moves from
 competitive to safe seats. The bias exaggerates chal-
 lenger spending effects that are getting weaker and
 deflates incumbent spending effects that may also be
 getting weaker.
 A second reason OLS estimates of challenger spend-
 ing effects appear insensitive to simultaneity bias may
 be that there actually is less such bias for challengers.
 Being less informed than incumbents, inexperienced
 challengers may estimate the expected vote with
 greater noise. In particular, they may be less able to
 gauge the unmeasured causes of the vote, such as their
 own vote appeal, the contribution of the previous
 challenger to the incumbent's previous margin, and any
 shift in the incumbent's attractiveness to voters.22
 A third reason, already noted, is the fundamental
 asymmetry of the simultaneity bias for challengers and
 incumbents: The vote-on-spending effects and spend-
 ing-on-vote effects have opposite signs for incumbents
 but the same sign for challengers. For favored incum-
 22 Some empirical support for this argument is reported in Erikson
 and Palfrey 1998.
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 TABLE 1. OLS Regression of Incumbent Vote on Spending by Expected Incumbent Vote
 Expected Incumbent Vote
 <52% 52-55% 55-58% >58% All Cases
 Constant 50.55 16.72 34.21 54.10 53.92
 (2.23) (0.48) (1.10) (17.52) (19.56)
 Log (I) 4.04 3.06 0.86 -0.10 0.07
 (2.21) (3.64) (1.59) (-0.56) (0.38)
 Log (C) -4.11 -4.37 -2.94 -3.41 -3.36
 (-3.49) (-7.80) (-6.47) (-26.34) (-27.83)
 Expected vote 0.00 0.95 0.86 0.73 0.70
 (0.00) (0.62) (0.59) (31.46) (36.07)
 Adj. R2 .193 .457 .291 .675 .722
 SEE 5.23 4.55 4.99 5.26 5.24
 N 40 77 119 1,556 1,792
 Note: T-statistics are given in parentheses.
 bents, the cycle is negative: New spending increases the
 incumbent's vote, which dampens the value of spend-
 ing further. For underdog challengers, the cycle is
 positive: New spending increases their vote, which
 amplifies the value of spending further. One statistical
 consequence is that (everything else being equal), in
 equilibrium, challenger spending will have greater vari-
 ance than incumbent spending, a pattern clearly ob-
 served in the data. As can be inferred from equations
 13 and 14, higher spending variance attenuates the bias
 in estimated spending effects. See Appendix A for
 further details.
 Putting the three parts of the explanation together,
 as one moves from competitive to safe districts, the
 OLS estimate of incumbent spending collapses due to
 the increased bias plus a possible decline in spending
 effectiveness when the seat is safe. Meanwhile, the OLS
 estimate of the challenger spending effect stays roughly
 constant, as the lesser bias may decline only modesty
 and is offset by the decline in spending effectiveness.23
 The CQ Expected Vote
 One alternative way of measuring perceived electoral
 closeness deserves our attention. We supplement our
 measurement of electoral expectations by incorporat-
 ing Congressional Quarterly's measure of the expected
 vote. During October of every campaign over the two
 decades of this analysis, CQ rated each of the 435
 House races on a scale from "safe Democratic" to "safe
 Republican."24
 23 As side evidence for declining spending effectiveness in general as
 seat safety increases, consider the OLS regression of the incumbent
 vote on the difference between I and C for different levels of Z. Since
 the IC difference expands as a function of the anticipated vote
 margin, the positive bias in this estimate should increase with Z, the
 instrument. Instead, the coefficient for the IC difference declines with
 Z.
 24 The CQ predictions are found in Congressional Quarterly's biennial
 election supplements. Each election year, Congressional Quarterly
 publishes a supplement of more than 100 pages, handicapping the
 congressional elections. The supplement is almost always published
 604
 We fold this scale based on incumbent party affilia-
 tion to form a scale of expected vulnerability. Three
 categories emerge (the numbers in parentheses are
 usable cases): close, coded by CQ as "favoring the
 challenger" or "too close to call" (N = 83); leaning,
 coded by CQ as "leaning" or "likely" for the incumbent
 (N = 340); and safe, coded by CQ as "safe" for the
 incumbent (N = 1,369).
 A district's rating on this scale reflects not only the
 exogenous variables that make up our measure of the
 expected vote but also the more intangible sources of
 the current vote (challenger strength, and so on) that
 candidates may observe during the campaign but are
 not part of our equation. To the extent that CQ raters
 observe the same intangible sources of the vote that
 candidates observe when they make their spending
 decisions, the simultaneity problem becomes mini-
 mized.
 This argument is not new (Abramowitz 1991). Fol-
 lowing logic similar to that in the previous paragraph,
 Abramowitz decided to include the CQ expected vote
 category in OLS equations predicting the incumbent
 vote. Even with CQ ratings on the right-hand side of
 the equation, the coefficient for incumbent spending
 was insignificant. Abramowitz concluded that the esti-
 mates of small incumbent spending effects were not an
 artifact of simultaneity bias, as commonly supposed.
 One limitation of CQ ratings as a control for intan-
 gible sources of the vote is that they chop the cases
 coarsely into only three usable categories, and 78% fall
 in the safe category. Obviously, different degrees of
 "safeness" are not distinguished. In contrast, the CQ
 ratings single out only a select few races as "close."
 Among the 83 cases so defined, there may be little
 variation in degree of vulnerability as observed by CQ
 or the candidates. In any case, CQ-coded close races
 are very close on average, so the simultaneity problem
 in issue 41 (the 41st week), and (for the years of our analysis) can
 always be found for the CQ issue for the date ranging from Octo-
 ber 9 to October 15.
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 TABLE 2. OLS Regression of Incumbent
 Vote on Spending by CQ Categories of
 Competitiveness
 CQ Forecast
 Close Leaning Safe All Cases
 Constant 41.02 51.98 48.92 50.98
 (3.59) (7.74) (16.26) (18.54)
 Log (I) 2.66 2.24 -0.27 0.09
 (2.33) (4.56) (-1.48) (0.55)
 Log (C) -2.31 -3.84 -2.64 -2.80
 (-1.96) (-8.88) (-18.51) (-20.33)
 Expected 0.07 0.38 0.73 0.66
 vote (0.70) (7.49) (35.06) (34.67)





 Adj. R2 .048 .296 .643 .735
 SEE 4.80 5.20 4.92 5.12
 N 83 340 1,369 1,792
 Note: T-statistics are given in parentheses.
 is minimal. The mean incumbent vote in the CQ-
 defined close races is 49.5%.
 In the analysis that follows, we estimate the vote
 equation separately for the three categories (close,
 leaning, and safe districts), using as right-hand-side
 variables the log of spending for incumbents, the log of
 spending for challengers, and our measure of the
 expected vote. We also show the results when we pool
 the cases, with CQ groupings on the right-hand side as
 dummy variables. Table 2 displays the results. (See
 Appendix B for the auxiliary analysis, which gives the
 results with challenger prior office added to the right-
 hand side and with Z replaced by its many component
 parts.) With the control for CQ ratings, the spending
 coefficients are slightly lower than in Table 1, because
 the ratings are created just a few weeks before the
 election and inevitably absorb some of the effects of
 early spending during the campaign.
 The fourth column of Table 2 shows the results with
 all cases pooled, comparable to column 5 of Table 1
 but with the addition of two CQ variables. Here, CQ
 categorization helps predict the vote independent of
 our expected-vote measure; just as Abramowitz ob-
 served, we find a nonsignificant coefficient for incum-
 bent spending. Simply including these variables in the
 regression does not redress the theoretical problem
 that equilibrium spending varies systematically with
 expected closeness. Hence, we consider the first three
 columns, which show the regressions separately by
 degree of CQ "safeness."
 In column 1 are the OLS results for races CQ
 defined as close. For this group, our expected vote
 measure is of little importance for predicting the
 outcome. Crucially, incumbent spending is statistically
 significant and, for the first time among our sets of
 equations, larger in absolute magnitude than the coef-
 ficient for challenger spending.25
 This result contrasts with that given in column 3, at
 the other end of the safety spectrum. For the vast bulk
 of contests deemed safe for the incumbent, the coeffi-
 cient for incumbent spending is nonsignificant, as if
 incumbent spending did not matter. In these races the
 simultaneity distortion is severe.
 In races that lean to the incumbent, column 2, the
 coefficient for incumbent spending is of lesser magni-
 tude than that for challenger spending.26 Yet, the
 incumbent spending coefficient is statistically signifi-
 cant, even with the evident simultaneity bias.
 Let us focus on the crucial set of races deemed by
 informed observers at the time as too close to call.
 These are the pivotal districts that were seen to be most
 in play during the actual election campaign. The in-
 cumbent spending coefficient for this set of cases is,
 if anything, slightly stronger than that for challengers
 because of a drastic reduction if not elimination of
 the simultaneity bias. In races that CQ rates too close
 to call, the simultaneity bias is minimal in the first
 place.
 Note that the coefficients for both incumbent and
 challenger spending in CQ's close races are lower than
 in races predicted to be close by the Z index. This is
 expected, because the CQ rating incorporates the
 effects of early spending. In effect, Table 2 shows the
 influence of unanticipated late spending by both can-
 didates, as measured by the proxies of incumbent and
 challenger spending levels over the duration of the
 campaign. Put another way, the coefficients for spend-
 ing were muted due to CQ's anticipation of their
 effects. Therefore, if anything, Table 2 underestimates
 the magnitudes of spending effects.
 CONCLUSION
 This article has examined a simple theoretical model of
 the spending game in an election between competing
 candidates for public office. That model strongly sug-
 gests a nonlinear relationship between expected incum-
 bent share of the vote and spending by both candidates.
 It also illuminates the nature of the simultaneity bias
 introduced when OLS regressions use cross-sectional
 data pooled across both safe and competitive districts.
 The key insight is that, in equilibrium, total spending is
 continuously increasing in the expected closeness of
 the race. Because total spending reaches a maximum
 when expected incumbent share of the vote is 50%, the
 slope of spending with respect to incumbent vulner-
 ability in this range is necessarily zero, so a sample
 25 The difference in magnitude is not statistically significant, how-
 ever. Using conventional significance levels, one cannot reject the
 null hypothesis that incumbent and challenger spending effects are
 equal.
 26 The null hypothesis of equal spending effects for incumbents and
 challengers is rejected at the .01 significance level.
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 that includes only close races (expected incumbent
 vote share in the neighborhood of 50%) will be
 immune from the kind of simultaneity bias that
 plagues OLS regression on the full sample. This
 facilitates a clean estimate of incumbent and chal-
 lenger spending effects.
 We tested the model with veteran incumbent U.S.
 House races from 1974 to 1990. For close races, not
 only does incumbent spending pass the threshold of
 statistical analysis but also our estimate of the size of
 this effect is statistically indistinguishable from the
 effect of challenger spending. Thus, in close races, a
 given amount of spending wins about as large a share
 of the vote for an incumbent as for a challenger. We
 also show clearly how the simultaneity problem grows
 progressively more severe as the closeness of races
 diminishes. Two different measures of expected close-
 ness are employed, and both yield identical conclu-
 sions. The first combines prespending long-term parti-
 san strength in the district, short-term national forces,
 and lagged incumbent vote. The second uses the
 preelection CQ categorization of close, incumbent-
 leaning, and safe races.
 Both the theory and empirical findings complement
 the results reported in Erikson and Palfrey (1998),
 which presents a three-equation model of spending and
 makes two qualitative findings: (1) Incumbent and
 challenger spending is an increasing function of race
 closeness, and (2) the estimated effects of incumbent
 spending decline with seniority. Point 1 is a central
 prediction of our theoretical model, and point 2 is
 consistent with the fact that junior incumbents are
 typically more vulnerable than senior incumbents. In
 our vulnerable incumbent subsample (expected vote
 <.52), nearly half (48%) were either sophomores or
 juniors, compared to only slightly more than one-third
 (36%) in the remaining races. As for the magnitude of
 spending effects, the estimates for veteran races in
 Erikson and Palfrey (1998) (and elsewhere in the
 literature) are smaller in magnitude than those re-
 ported here for close races. There are two possible
 reasons. First, because of pooling over all races, close
 and safe, the estimates elsewhere could be biased, even
 with carefully designed methods to correct for simul-
 taneity. We showed here, both theoretically and em-
 pirically, that the degree of bias will vary with incum-
 bent vulnerability in predictable ways, and this is not
 accounted for in those methods. Second, it may be that
 spending effects are indeed high in a tight race, due to
 its saliency to the voters and extensive media coverage.
 This interesting possibility would require a new ap-
 proach to sort out differences in spending effects as a
 function of incumbent vulnerability.
 To summarize, the results presented here have po-
 tentially important consequences for understanding
 the connection between money and the incumbency
 advantage. Incumbents outspend challengers and, ac-
 cording to our analysis, achieve roughly equal effec-
 tiveness per dollar in close races, where it matters most.
 In popular discussions, fundraising capacity is seen as a
 606
 major source of the incumbency advantage. Political
 scientists have hesitated to endorse this view, in part
 because it is difficult to estimate spending effects. Our
 findings have implications too complex to explore here,
 but they should finally put to rest any lingering doubt
 about the significance (and similarity) of incumbent
 and challenger spending effects in close races.
 APPENDIX A
 Consider our three-equation system with Z fixed at some
 level:
 V== 3vIl + AvcC + Ev; (15)
 I = revV + wI; and (16)
 C = ACV + wc. (17)
 Since T3v and 1cv themselves vary as a function of expected
 vote, we fix Z (the instrument for expected vote) in the
 analysis below, so TV and 3cv can be treated as constant.27
 Our interest is in the bias in the OLS estimates of Tv3 and
 Sac, the spending effects on vote. The analysis below derives
 the asymptotic bias of the OLS estimate of Tv,. Calculation
 of the asymptotic bias of Ace is done in a similar way.
 To start, by successive algebraic substitution, we solve the
 simultaneous equations for I, V, and C and obtain the
 following exact expression for the OLS estimate of TV,. The
 lowercase symbols indicate sample values of V, C, and I;
 observations in the sample are indexed by j; and b1c is the
 sample bivariate regression coefficient of I on C.
 Ej (ij - bIccj)(v - bvCcj)
 VI Ei (ij - blc;C) (18)
 Ej (ij - bJCC) 2
 OLS = EVI + (ij -bloc;)(19)
 Applying the rules of probability limit gives
 I ~~cov(I - yC, ev)
 plim VI =VI var(I - ,yC) (20)
 where y is the expected value of b1c. Some more algebra
 yields the following expressions:
 cov(I, F-1) V d
 cov(C ~ =1 - r314vpv - tPcvt3vcan
 var(I- yC) = (T2- y2(c2
 which gives
 plim LEVI = rEVI + (1 2 - 2fcvrfvc)(& - y2of2)
 =VI + As, (21)
 where
 27 Recall that Re and Ac vary as a function of V, so, for any fixed
 Z, they are only approximately constant.
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 ( p-,VV- rCVVC)-)y& -y2a2)
 and
 cI = ?IV- 'Yfcv.
 So the asymptotic bias of the OLS estimate of the incum-
 bent spending effect on vote is simply A(D. Because A is
 always positive, the sign of the bias is determined by the sign
 of '1, which is governed by the signs of jv, f3cv, and y.
 It follows immediately that if jv = cv = 0, then the
 asymptotic bias disappears. This is indeed our main theoret-
 ical point, since our model implies that ftv = Pcv = 0 when
 the expected vote is 5050.28 Therefore, spending effects fv3
 and E3va can be estimated consistently by restricting attention
 to close races. This key result also would hold in more
 general models if one were to introduce additional parame-
 ters to index the degree of the simultaneity problem, as in
 Erikson and Palfrey (1998).
 We next turn to signing the bias for the remainder of races
 in our sample, those in which the incumbent is expected to
 win with a safe margin. For these races, our model shows that
 ftv and cv are both negative. Therefore, unless y is very
 large, the sign of Tjv will determine the sign of the asymp-
 totic bias. If y = 0 (as discussed in the text), then the sign of
 the bias is determined by the sign of LIZ, which is negative for
 safe races, by the game-theoretic model.29 The bias could not
 necessarily be signed were y very large (and positive), but
 empirically it turns out that y is small, which implies the
 intuitive result that OLS causes a downward bias in the
 estimated incumbent spending effect.
 By similar argument, we can obtain the following expres-
 sion for the bias in challenger spending effects:
 plim OLS = vc + ((CV1- 8rIcv)( v
 where 8 is the expected value of bcl, and the asymptotic bias
 is determined by the sign of (ace - 8Prv). As with the
 incumbent, if fjv = Pcv = 0, then OLS estimates are
 consistent. Otherwise, the bias is negative (which overesti-
 mates the effect of challenger spending, since Eva < 0)
 unless 8 is very large and positive, in which case the negative
 bias becomes negligible or possibly reverses sign. Empirically,
 it turns out that 8 is much larger than y, which helps explain
 why the data for safe races indicate a greater problem of
 simultaneity bias in "s compared to ?Vs. By definition,
 8 = (4r2/ur2) y, and empirically 'xc > (n2 (even with Z held
 constant, as we have been assuming throughout). The latter
 fact has implications for the numerator and denominators of
 both bias terms. This is evident from inspection of equations
 13 and 14.
 The difference in magnitude between 4r2 and (no is partly
 driven by fine details of the simultaneous system. From
 equations 15-17 we can decompose (n2 and ur2 as follows:
 + +
 T2 =Il2VU + (UC + 2Pjvrvjl;
 r3CVV UI CVuc
 (T2C = V(3cv2 + (3U2 + 213cv(3v~uc.
 28 By continuity, the asymptotic bias is approximately 0 for close
 races in the neighborhood of 50-50.
 29 For the rare races in which the challenger is expected to win
 handily, the bias will have the perverse opposite sign, and incumbent
 spending effects would be overestimated.
 Due to the opposite signs of the spending-on-vote effects, the
 terms (T,,,, and (Tv C have opposite signs, with 0T.,>, > 0 and
 (SAC < 0. As a result, 2Ijvaviu, < 0 and 2r3cv(YvuC > 0,
 thus expanding u, while contracting 4rc, even if everything
 else is symmetric between incumbents and challengers.
 APPENDIX B
 Our presentation of results in the text is drawn from regres-
 sions in which the control variables are summarized in terms
 of the predicted vote, or Z in the terminology of our
 statistical discussion. The measure Z is derived from a
 reduced-form regression that predicts the vote from its
 exogenous sources-the lagged incumbent vote, the district
 presidential vote, and dummy variables representing year,
 incumbent party, region (South/non-South), and their inter-
 actions. The regression equation that produces Z is shown in
 Table B-i.
 In the text, the key regressions (tables 1 and 2) predict the
 vote, when it is expected to be close, from the two spending
 variables plus Z. Other specifications are possible. For the
 record, tables B-2 and B-3 present estimates from our key
 equations using regressions in which there is no control and
 in which Z is replaced by its 34 component parts. To provide
 complete information, and comparability with past findings,
 tables B-2 and B-3 also show the insignificant contribution of
 a dummy variable, whether the challenger held prior elective
 office. This dummy typically produces significant effects in
 regressions that use the full cross-section of races (Jacobson
 1978).
 The contribution (or lack of it) of the prior office dummy
 variable is noteworthy. Although it shows the expected
 negative effect on incumbent vote when all cases are com-
 bined, its effect is statistically insignificant when the regres-
 sions are conducted separately on each safeness category.
 Furthermore, the inclusion or exclusion of this dummy has no
 effect on our estimated coefficients on incumbent and chal-
 lenger spending.
 In theory, the separate components should predict the vote
 no better than their summary measure, Z. This is confirmed
 by the deterioration of the explained variance when the
 components are substituted for Z. Also as expected, we
 observe that the coefficients for incumbent and challenger
 spending are unaffected by the replacement of Z by its
 components. But also as expected, because substituting the
 components for Z uses additional statistical degrees of
 freedom, this substitution expands the standard errors of the
 coefficients. (Tables B-2 and B-3 present standard errors
 rather than t-values in order to highlight that the declines in
 significance are due to inflated standard errors rather than
 deflated regression coefficients.)
 For the key regressions, the spending coefficients are
 insensitive to the control for Z, and they even show about the
 same values when there are no control variables whatsoever.
 In fact, except for the set of incumbent-leaning districts, Z
 and its components make little contribution to the equations
 at all. This is as one would expect. When Z is held constant
 at values below 52% or between 52% and 55%, its range is
 sufficiently restricted for the presence of controls to be of
 little practical consequence. In effect, Z is already controlled.
 Similarly, the control matters little for districts that CQ rates
 as too close to call. The reason here is that CQ takes into
 account variables omitted by Z. Once a race is rated a
 toss-up, it matters not whether the verdict results from
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 TABLE B-1. Coefficients from Regression Equation Generating Z, the Predicted Vote
 Incumbent Votet = ayrp + 0.63 (0.02) x Incumbent Votet-1 + 0.22 (0.02) x Presidential Vote,
 where ayrp is the following matrix of year-region-party dummies
 Nonsouthern Southern Nonsouthern Southern
 Year Republicans Republicans Democrats Democrats
 1974 2.25 1.49 17.64 18.72
 (1.94) (2.40) (1.91) (2.90)
 1976 13.97 11.85 10.98 8.80
 (1.93) (2.33) (1.92) (1.92)
 1978 14.69 14.89 10.69 12.29
 (1.95) (2.59) (1.99) (2.24)
 1980 14.49 12.11 9.63 7.03
 (1.95) (3.19) (1.89) (2.31)
 1984 15.68 14.81 10.05 6.12
 (1.95) (2.72) (1.96) (2.31)
 1986 11.46 10.23 16.91 21.21
 (1.91) (2.53) (1.89) (2.28)
 1988 12.84 12.40 13.22 14.16
 (1.91) (2.35) (1.90) (2.31)
 1990 6.11 5.85 10.29 14.05
 (1.93) (2.20) (1.89) (2.24)
 Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. N = 1,792. Coefficients for year-party-region combinations represent the constant or intercept particular
 to the specific set of cases.
 TABLE B-2. OLS Regression of Incumbent Vote on Spending by Expected Incumbent Vote,
 Controlling for Z and Its Components
 Z < 52 52 < Z < 55
 Control Z, Control Z Control Z, Control Z
 No Prior Components, No Prior Components,
 Control Control Z Office Prior Office Control Control Z Office Prior Office
 Constant 50.55 50.55 52.35 16.80 51.26 18.12
 (15.94) (22.71) (23.09) (35.10) (37.54) (35.42)
 Log (I) 4.04 4.04 4.08 5.60 3.07 3.06 3.04 2.61
 (1.65) (1.85) (1.84) (3.26) (0.85) (0.84) (0.84) (1.41)
 Log (C) -4.11 -4.11 -3.95 -5.17 -4.47 -4.37 -4.32 -4.65
 (1.16) (1.18) (1.21) (1.61) (0.56) (0.56) (0.57) (0.70)
 Exp. vote (Z) -0.00 -0.07 0.95 0.93
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.62) (0.62)
 IV-1 0.02 0.41
 (0.51) (0.48)
 PV -0.32 0.09
 (0.28) (0.19)
 C's prior office -1.10 1.63 -0.51 -0.53
 (1.77) (2.16) (1.10) (1.21)
 Year-party-region not not
 dummies significant significant
 Adj R 2 . 22 .19 .18 .05 .45 .46 .45 .45 l
 SEE 5.16 5.23 5.27 5.70 4.60 4.55 4.58 4.59
 N 40 40 40 40 77 77 77 77
 Note: IVt_1 = lagged incumbent vote. PV = incumbent party presidential vote (1976 or 1988). Year-party-region dummies represent combinations of
 the year, incumbent party, and South/non-South. Constants are not reported when year-party-region dummies are used, since the choice of base
 category is arbitrary. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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 TABLE B-3. OLS Regression of Incumbent Vote on Spending by CQ Categories of
 Competitiveness, Controlling for Z and Its Components
 CQ Rated Close CQ Rated Leaning Incumbent
 Control Z, Control Z Control Z, Control Z
 No Prior Components, No Prior Components,
 Control Control Z Office Prior Office Control Control Z Office Prior Office
 Constant 44.89 41.05 41.50 78.37 51.99 52.16
 (9.99) (11.43) (11.60) (6.17) (6.71) (6.72)
 Log (I) 2.84 2.67 2.61 2.33 2.16 2.23 2.24 1.31
 (1.11) (1.14) (1.16) (1.46) (0.53) (0.49) (0.49) (0.66)
 Log (C) -2.47 -2.31 -2.30 -1.45 -4.07 -3.84 -3.84 -3.83
 (1.16) (1.18) (1.19) (1.41) (0.46) (0.43) (0.43) (0.46)
 Exp. vote (Z) 0.07 0.07 0.38 0.37
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
 IVt_1 -0.08 0.13
 (0.09) (0.05)
 PV 0.06 0.01
 (0.10) (0.05)
 C's prior office -0.34 0.26 -0.47 -0.58
 (1.09) (1.28) (0.58) (0.60)
 Year-party-region not significant at
 dummies significant .01 level
 Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.30 0.30 0.33
 SEE 4.78 4.80 4.83 4.50 5.60 5.20 5.20 5.08
 N 83 83 83 83 340 340 340 340
 Note: IVt-1 = lagged incumbent vote. PV = incumbent party presidential vote (1976 or 1988). Year-party-region dummies represent combinations of
 the year, incumbent party, and South/non-South. Constants are not reported when year-party-region dummies are used, since the choice of base
 category is arbitrary. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
 measurable variables composing Z or intangible sources of
 candidate strength and weakness known to CQ and other
 observers but not measured as part of Z.
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